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A Strange Kind of Identity Theft:
How Competing Definitions of "Indian" May Deny
Individual Identity
SUZIANNE D. PAINTER-THORNEt

When I was a little girl, I learned about my family's
heritage the same way everyone else does-from my parents
and grandparents. My mother, grandmother, and aunts were
open about my family's Native American heritage, and I
never had any reason to doubt them. What kid asks their
grandparents for .legal documentation to go along with their
family stories? What kid asks their mother for proof in how
she describes herself? My heritage is a part of who I amand I am proud of it.
-U.S.

Senate candidate Elizabeth Warren1
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immeasurably by all of their contributions and I very much appreciate the generosity of their time. I
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Lewis who provided excellent research assistance. Thanks to the student members and editors of the
Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal for their editorial assistance in preparing this article for
publication I also appreciate the generous financial assistance from the Mercer Law School. The
mistakes are mine.
' Charles P. Pierce, Liz Warren Sets Herself Up for a Summer of Crazy, ESQUIRE (May 31, 2012),
http://perma.cc/W8RN-Q42T; see also Noah Bierman, Warren Sends Letter to Supporters Trying to
Calm Native American Controversy, BOSTON GLOBE (May 31, 2012), http://perma.cc/789Z-MY6C.

CONNECTICUTPUBLICINTEREST LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

I. INTRODUCTION

To the extent we think about it all, most of us believe what our parents

tell us about where we came from-about who our grandparents are, who

our ancestors were, our ethnic background, our family histories.2 My own
family story includes claims to Scottish, Irish, French, and English
ancestry. It also includes the Cherokee great-grandmother so popular in
American genealogical stories.
I have not undertaken an extensive
genealogical search to more accurately pinpoint the threads of my ancestral
quilt; I have simply accepted the family lore without much thought to
whether it was verifiable.3
My family's claimed link to the Cherokee is not unique. In fact, claims
of Indian heritage have been called "one of the most common genealogical
myths in the United States." 4 For most people, talking about their Indian
grandmother or relying on family stories to self-identify as Indian-at least
in part-is not particularly noteworthy. However, during the 2012 election
season, a firestorm erupted over then-U.S. Senate candidate Elizabeth
Warren's assertion that she had Cherokee and Delaware Indian ancestors.5
Warren based her claim on family lore-i.e., she learned of her ancestry
from comments about her grandfather's "high cheekbones" and from
stories told to her by her mother and by 7her grandparents. 6 It was an
identity she grew up believing about herself.
Her opponent in the Senate race, Scott Brown, took exception to
Warren's claim. Pointing to Warren during a debate, Scott explained,
"Professor Warren claimed she was a Native American, a person of color
2

Other politicians have also discovered that family lore may not be a terribly reliable source of

ancestry or history. For example, although U.S. Senator Marco Rubio grew up believing his family had
fled Castro's Cuba, it was later revealed that his parents had emigrated from Cuba two years before
Castro's takeover. Similarly, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was raised by Catholic
parents who she later learned were actually Jewish refugees who hid their identity after escaping the
Holocaust. Garance Franke-Ruta, Is Elizabeth Warren Native American or What?, THE ATLANTIC
(May 20, 2012), http://perma.cc/6L37-4RTG.
3 To be clear, I do not claim any Indian ancestry. Nor do I claim to have any special insight into
Indian culture. Rather, in this article, I focus on the legal implications of Indian status.
4 Id. For instance, both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have claimed Indian heritage, though
none was found after extensive genealogical research. See Hillary Chabot, Harvard Trips on Roots of
Elizabeth Warren's Family Tree, BOSTON HERALD (Apr. 27, 2012), available at
http://perma.cc/AMT7-KM3T.
5 Franke-Ruta, supra note 2. Interestingly, Warren reports that the reason her parents eloped was
because her father's family objected to her mother's Indian ancestry. Brian McGrory, Warren: 'Y Won't
Deny Who lAm', BOSTON GLOBE (June 1, 2012), http://perma.cc/8T2M-BLSV.
6 Franke-Ruta, supranote 2.
7 Id. ("Being Native American has been part of my story I guess since the day I was born,
These are my family stories, I have lived in a family that has talked about Native American [sic] and
talked about tribes since I was a little girl."). Growing up in Oklahoma, Warren's experience was not
atypical. See Sarah Burris, Elizabeth Warren's Native American Roots No Surprise in Oklahoma,
POLITICO (May 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/T3KY-4WVV.
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and as you can see, she is not."8 Brown was not the only skeptic.
While largely limited to partisans, the anger and doubt included protests by
Cherokee Indians who associated Warren's claim with a "history of people
coming in and trying to get the benefits of being an Indian without having
faced the hardships that their family might have experienced in the past
and their ancestors might have experienced." 9
In the ensuing kerfuffle, Warren was accused of everything from lying,
to fraud, to "ethnic identity theft."1 The anger directed at Warren was
visceral. There was an underlying assumption that Warren had somehow
"gamed the system"; that she had materially gained by asserting Indian
heritage. In the words of Brown, Warren had "claimed something she

-

wasn't entitled to."11
While much of the controversy can be attributed to political posturing
in a hotly contested Senate race, it also brought to light conflicting notions
of self-identity and ethnic authenticity. 12 When Scott Brown complained
that Elizabeth Warren did not "look" Indian, he suggested that identity is
something visibly determined. He was not alone in this suggestion. Many
press accounts and op-ed articles fixated on supposed defining features of
"Indian" as a matter of physical characteristics,' 3 singling out Warren's
"fair skin," "blue eyes," and "blond hair" as proof that her claim could not

8 Sean Sullivan, The Fight over Elizabeth Warren's Heritage,Explained, WASH. POST (Sept. 27,
2012), http://perma.cc/LX4R-7DDL. However, given the Cherokee's history of intermarriage, there is
no reason a Cherokee member could not look just like Warren. Franke-Ruta, supra note 2.
9 Who Gets To Decide Who Is Native American?, NPR (August 9, 2012), http://perma.cc/D8PB9J2W.
10See, e.g., David Yeagley, Warrantfor Warren: Indian Identity Theft is a Crime (May 3, 2012),

BAD EAGLE JOURNAL, http://perma.cc/Z8W2-KYKP.
" David Treuer, Kill the Indians, Then Copy Them, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2012), available at,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/kill-the-indians-then-copy-them.html?_r=0.
12There's a reason the summer months before an election are referred to as "the silly season" (See
e.g., Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Race in America, 72 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1019-20
(2009) (noting that "'[s]illy season' was at its peak" as demonstrated by "controversies about whether
Michelle Obama's Blackness would be a political boon or problem for her husband's racial authenticity
.....
");
Nicholas W. Allard, Commentary: "Copyright from Stone Age Caves to the Celestial Jukebox,"
17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 867, 878 (1995) (commenting that "Congress will be very slow to
act and will likely not take up the issue before the politically silly season of 1996 presidential politics
destroys any potential for productive legislative work"), and it is impossible to shake the notion that
this was nothing more than a manufactured outrage for political gamesmanship, but this article will
take Warren's detractors as sincere in their criticisms.
13Anthropologists have long pointed out that race is a human construct, a myth, that has no basis
in biology. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths ofIdentity: Individual and Group Portraitsof Race and Sexual

Orientation,43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 305-08 (1995). Nonetheless, physical features were often taken
as proxy or indicators of "race." Id.at 271-72.
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be true. 14 Such an argument makes sense only if we believe Indian identity
is determined by physical appearance.15
Dismissing any suggestion that Warren's claim was nothing more than
pride of ancestry, her critics focused on the "privileges" she supposedly
gained by invoking Indian heritage. 16 For his part, Brown charged that
Warren wrongfully "checked the box"'17 and "claimed something she
wasn't entitled to."' 18 Contrary to her critics' suggestion, however, Warren

had not tangibly benefitted from her purported ancestry. 19 Warren never
claimed that she was an enrolled member of any tribe, nor had she ever
sought tribal membership.20 Likewise, Warren never attempted to secure
any benefits accorded to tribal members or to legally-defined Indian
persons.21 Contrary to the main charge from her critics, Warren had not
14

See, e.g Charlotte Allen, She's a Blond, Blue-Eyed Cherokee?, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE

(May 31, 2012), availableat, http://perma.cc/33HS-579T ("Naturally, though, when there is something
to be gained from racial self-creation . . . there are going to be jeers when a blond with a taste for
French cuisine checks off the box marked Cherokee.") (emphasis added); George F. Will, Identity
Politics, WASH. POST, (May 24, 2012), available at, http://perma.cc/EXZA-LMGF ("Blond, blue-eyed
Elizabeth Warren, the Senate candidate in Massachusetts and Harvard professor who cites "family
lore" that she is 1/32nd Cherokee, was inducted into Oklahoma's Hall of Fame last year."); Tom
Thurlow, Why The Elizabeth Warren Controversy Continues, BREITBART.COM, (June 6, 2012),
http://perma.cc/66SF-RDBM ("Her features are almost the exact opposite of Native American features:
fair skin, blond hair, blue eyes."); Michael Graham, Elizabeth Warren 's Goose is Cooked, BOSTON
2012,
May
18,
HERALD,
http://bostonherald.com/newsopinion/opinion/oped/2012/05/elizabethwarrenE2%80%
(comparing Warren's physical features to the members of the Swedish band ABBA); Debra J.
Saunders, Elizabeth Warren is Not a Dumb Blonde, TOWNHALL.COM (May 29, 2012),
http://perma.cc/CJ33-4ULN ("Why would a blue-eyed blonde who looks very white and who belongs
to no tribe (who can only claim a great-great-great-grandmother Cherokee ancestor) nonetheless
designate herself as a Native American?"). However, given the Cherokee's history of intermarriage,
there is no reason a Cherokee member could not look just like Warren. Franke-Ruta, supra note 2.
According to Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, a spokesperson for the Cherokee Nation in Oklahoma, "'There
are a lot of folks who are legitimately Cherokee who are not eligible for citizenship,' . . . because, for
example, their ancestors lived in distant states or territories when the rolls were drawn up, or because
they are direct descendants of people left off the rolls for other reasons." Id.
15Of course, by citing her grandfather's cheekbones, Warren herself invoked physical appearance
as proof of identity.
16
NPR, supranote 9.
17 Josh

Hicks, Everything You Need to Know about Elizabeth Warren 's Claim to Native American

Heritage,WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), http://perma.cc/H4A7-BE9L.
18Treuer, supra note 11.
19 Hicks, supra note 17; Franke-Ruta, supra note 2. She did, apparently, submit recipes to an

Indian cookbook and signed her name "Elizabeth Warren-Cherokee." Id.
20 See Franke-Ruta, supra note 2.
21Initially it was reported that Warren was 1/32 Cherokee, and it was pointed out that was the
same ratio as the current principal Cherokee chief. Michael Tomasky, Michael Tomasky on the Media 's
Foolish Elizabeth Warren Witch Hunt, THE DAILY BEAST (May 26, 2012), http://perma.cc/SS4GTURE; Suzan Harjo, What's the Deal with Elizabeth Warren, Cherokee?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(May 15, 2012), http://perma.cc/Q7TX-57YF. While the largest Cherokee tribe does not have a blood
quantum requirement, the two other Cherokee nations do have such a requirement. Thus, someone with
less than 1/32 blood quantum could be enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, but not
qualify for membership in the Eastern Band, which requires 1/16 Eastern Cherokee blood quantum, or
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used Indian
ancestry to obtain any preference in school admission or
22
hiring.
Although she received no material benefit, Warren nonetheless
maintained her unwavering belief in her family history in the face of vocal
and often harsh criticism. She held to her Indian ancestry despite a dearth
of genealogical evidence, tribal membership, or legal eligibility for any
material benefit.23 Indeed, it does not appear that Warren ever attempted to

the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee, which requires 1/4 Keetoowah Cherokee blood. FrankeRuta, supra note 2. While all three Cherokee tribes require a direct line to the Dawes Rolls, the latter
two tribes also require certification by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as having the requisite blood
quantum through a "Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood." Id. This makes it difficult to prove
fractional Indian heritage, at least using a "citizen-based" definition of Indian heritage. Furthermore,
unlike Warren, the chief is an enrolled member. But for many people, this similarity (until it
disappeared, Chabot, supra note 4) seemed to settle the case because too often tribal membership is
equated with race or ethnicity. See Harjo, supra note 21. And, unlike Warren, the Cherokee chief can
trace his ancestry to the Dawes Roll and he was born and raised in Cherokee County. Franke-Ruta,
supra note 2. Thus far, no ancestor of Warren's has been traced to the Dawes Rolls, an inalterable
requirement for Cherokee tribal membership. Rather, all Warren's ancestors self-identify as "white."
Id. The possible ancestor identified by genealogists was O.C. Sarah Smith, who---even assuming she
was Cherokee--died before the Dawes Rolls were created. Id. None of Smith's descendants were listed
on the rolls. Id.
22 Warren's detractors acknowledged that she did not disclose any Indian ancestry prior to being
admitted to a school. Franke-Ruta, supra note 2. During a debate, Warren's opponent, Senator Scott
Brown, did accuse Warren of improperly "checking the box" to gain an advantage in applying to Penn
and Harvard Law. According to Brown, "[Elizabeth Warren] checked the box. She had an opportunity,
actually, to make a decision throughout her career. When she applied to Penn and Harvard, she checked
the box claiming she was Native American, and, you know, clearly she's not." Hicks, supra note 17.
However, contrary to Brown's claims, Warren did not list herself as a minority when applying to law
school even though her law school had a program for minority students. Elizabeth Hartfield, Elizabeth
Warren Did Not List as Minority on Law School Application, Was Touted as One by U. Penn, ABC
NEWS (May 10, 2012), http://perma.cc/Y92K-6T4W. Nonetheless, critics did question Warren's
motives in later claiming Indian status by listing herself as a minority in AALS Directory of Faculty
from 1986 to 1995. See Noah Bierman, Records Shed More Light on Elizabeth Warren's Minority
Status, BOSTON GLOBE, (May 31, 2012), http://perma.cc/6A2X-RGAA; McGrory, supra note 5. Before
1986, Warren was listed in the Directory as Caucasian; after starting at Harvard, she no longer listed
herself as minority in the Directory. Id. Nonetheless, both Harvard and University of Pennsylvania law
schools indicated she was Native American in school literature. Franke-Ruta, supra note 2; Elizabeth
Hartfield, Elizabeth Warren Did Not List as Minority on Law School Application, Was Touted as One
by U. Penn, ABC NEWS (May 10, 2012), http://perma.cc/Y92K-6T4W. Harvard's affirmative action
plan defines "Native American" as "[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples of North
America and who maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition."
Mary Carmichael, Filings Raise More Questions on Warren's Ethnic Claims, BOSTON GLOBE, (May
25, 2012), http://perma.cc/BTE9-6Q92 (citing Harvard University Affirmative Action Plan 1999 at 15).
However, it was widely reported and acknowledged that Warren did not inform either school of her
claimed Native American status until after she was hired. Indeed, both schools stated that her Indian
status was not a factor in recruiting or hiring her. E.g. McGrory, supra note 5; Mary Carmichael,
Filings Raise More Questions on Warren's Ethnic Claims, BOSTON GLOBE, (May 25, 2012),
http://perma.cc/BTE9-6Q92; Hicks, supra note 17; Chabot, supra note 4; Franke-Ruta, supranote 2.
23 According to the New England Historic Genealogical Society, an initial search revealed no
evidence that "Warren's great-great-great-grandmother O.C. Sarah Smith either is or is not of Cherokee
descent." NEHGS, NEHGS Statement on Elizabeth Warren Ancestry, AMERICAN ANCESTORS: NEW
ENGLAND HISTORICAL GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY, (May 15, 2012), http://perma.cc/DW3L-ZGCN. The
Society expressed no intent to further research Warren's ancestry, instead referring to the availability of
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document her claim. 2 4 Perhaps it would have been easier for Warren to
claim a mistake and try to move past the controversy. Instead, she
steadfastly maintained her ancestry: .'I know who I am,'... 'I know my
heritage.' 25 While legally-speaking, Warren was not Cherokee, she held
to the more intangible benefits of cultural belonging and personal identity.
The preoccupation with what Warren stood to gain by claiming Indian
ancestry appears to conflate family lore with the legal consequences of
Indian status. It is that conflict between legal and social implications of
"Indianness" that is the focus of this article. Part II will discuss the legal
and social consequences that flow from Indian status in the United States.
Part III will then discuss the myriad legal definitions of "Indian" and how
the application of a particular definition can determine the status of an
individual as part of a cultural group. Because federal law includes more
than thirty definitions of Indian, the purpose for which the claim is made
can affect whether a person is considered legally "Indian." Consequently,
an individual could be considered Indian under one area of federal law, but
not under another. While most people are unlikely to encounter significant
problems under this scheme, for some the effect can be profound. Part IV
will look at three circumstances where the application of a particular
definition can determine an individual's Indian status, resulting in concrete
legal consequences. Specifically, it will consider how definitions work to
include or exclude individuals in criminal prosecutions, sharing of gaming
revenue, and the adoptive placement of Indian children. Part V then
considers whether, given the real life consequences, a cohesive definition
of Indian is possible or desirable.
II. BEING "INDIAN"

For many, claims of Indian ancestry rest on the same foundation on
which Americans lay claim to other ethnic or racial ancestries. The claims
are not a precise genealogical exercise, but an expression of family history
and lore. My red hair doesn't prove my Irish heritage any more than
Warren's grandfather's cheekbones prove her Indian heritage.
Nevertheless, saying I'm Irish does not prompt similar calls for proof or
charges of theft as those directed at Warren.26 This difference is perhaps a
consequence of the unique place Indians occupy in American history,
public records while noting such research could take months or even years before any definitive answer
could be reached. Id.
24 NPR, supra note 9.
25 McGrory, supra note 5.
26 In one debate, Warren's opponent, then-Senator Scott Brown, contended that Warren had
wrongfully "checked the box" to achieve some benefit to which she was clearly not entitled. The
charge was not true, but nonetheless, the suggestion that Warren stood to gain permeated the criticism.
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culture, and law. Simply put, unlike a claim of Irish or Italian ancestry, a

claim of Indian heritage can implicate myriad legal consequences. Federal
statutes specifically drafted to apply to Indian people rely on Indian status
to determine jurisdiction, trigger federal oversight, or ensure access to
certain benefits.27 It is perhaps because of the benefits28that some have
suggested that Indian status is itself a "property interest."
Much of the preoccupation with Indian status stems from a "shared
misconception... that 'a little Indian blood' gives rise to vast privilegesa share of immense gambling riches, broad exemptions from all taxes, and
other rights not shared by those without it."'29 While there may be benefits

that accompany Indian status, they are not nearly as vast or "special" as is
too often assumed or asserted.3 ° Moreover, the criteria for receiving any
benefits are more complicated than the phrase "checking a box" suggests.
Further, there are intangible benefits of cultural belonging that may
motivate individual claims to Indian status far more than any desire for
material gain.
First, being an Indian can mean access to certain federal programs not
available to non-Indians. As part of its trust relationship with tribes, the
federal government operates several programs designed to protect tribal
lands, assist tribal governments, and assist the educational and health needs
of individual Indians through agencies such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and the Indian Health Service. 31 In addition, Indians and Indian-owned
businesses may have immunity from state taxation in certain
circumstances.32 In those respects, Indians have access to government
27

See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25

U.S.C. § 1901 (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. (2002) ;Indian Arts & Crafts Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1159
(2012); Indian Healthcare Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); Indian Alcohol Substance
Abuse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2403 (2012).
28 See GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF
1990 138 (1997).
29 Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 23, 27 (2013),
available at http://perma.cc/YLW-7H9P.
30And are oftentimes offset by the burdens and perils of being Indian in America.
31See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, What We Do, http://perma.cc/J48G-2JWX; INDIAN HEALTH
SERVICES, Basisfor Health Services, http://perma.cc/WJ7B-FRJY.
32 See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976) (finding that

supremacy clause bars states from imposing property taxes on property owned by tribal members on
reservations, business license fees on Indian-owned businesses operated on reservations, and state
cigarette taxes on cigarettes sold on reservations by Indians to Indians); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973) (holding no state income tax on income earned on reservation
by tribal members). But see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992) (finding that Indians not immune from state-imposed ad
valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee pursuant to General Allotment Act); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980) (finding that onreservation Indians who were not members of tribe were not immune from state cigarette taxes because
they were not tribal constituents).
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services not available to non-Indians. For instance, the Indian Health
Service provides health care services to Indians and their family
members.33 The Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities Act
provides resources for educational institutions that serve tribal members
and their biological descendants.34 Indian students may also have access to
scholarships or admissions for diversity. Likewise, Indian persons enjoy
preferential treatment in hiring in some federal agencies such as the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service.35
Further, Indian status can mean broader or preferential access to
natural resources as a consequence of treaty-based fishing and hunting
rights.36 Tribes may have priority on water resources, which includes a
right to enough water to meet the tribes' needs even where water is scarce,
such as in the Southwest. Tribes may also retain rights to natural resource
deposits on tribal lands and, in some cases, on lands ceded by earlier
treaties.37 Indians are the only ethnic group that Congress has agreed to act
in furtherance of their cultural survival. For instance, the Indian Arts and
Crafts Acts works specifically to protect Indian cultural property.38
Likewise, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
protects Indian cultural items, including human remains, funerary objects,
sacred objects, and items of cultural patrimony.39
However, many of the policies affecting Indians and Indian tribes did
not grow out of any special consideration for Indian people, but rather as a
reaction to a history of maltreatment, cultural appropriation, and attempts
40
Moreover, many
to undermine tribal governments and tribal societies.
benefits received by Indians are similar to those available to non-Indians,
although the programs may be authorized and administered separate from
the general programs. For instance, Indians may be eligible for food
stamp, job training and placement programs, as well as housing assistance
33Indian Health Service, 42 C.F.R. § 136.12 (2014).
3425 U.S.C. §§ 1801(7)(B), 1802 (2012).
35See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
36 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 n.4 (1986) (recognizing that individual Indians
are protected by rights negotiated by tribes); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES:
THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 419-27 (1994).
37Courts have upheld tribal claims to up to fifty percent of salmon and steelhead from fisheries in
some of the most hotly contested cases brought before the Supreme Court.
3818 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
9See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2012).
40See Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, Contested Objects, Contested Meanings: Native American
Grave Protection Laws and the Interpretation of Culture, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261 (2002)
(detailing historical abuse of Indian cultural and funerary items); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step
Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the "Existing Indian Family" Exception (Re)imposes Anglo
American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of CulturalAutonomy, 33 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 329 (2009) (discussing historical basis for Congress's passage of ICWA).
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separate from the programs available to non-Indians. 41 The Bureau of
Indian Education provides operational support for reservation elementary
and secondary schools.42
While much of the discussion around the Warren's identity was
preoccupied with the "benefits" of Indian status, Indians also experience
unique obligations and responsibilities.
One consequence of tribal
sovereignty is that individual tribal Indians are more regulated than other
United States citizens. Tribes have their own body of tribal law-codes,
constitutions, regulations, zoning, taxation, tradition, custom-that apply
to tribal members. In addition, tribal Indians are still subject to federal and
state law.43 Consequently, tribal Indians are subject to the rules of three
sovereigns-the United States, their individual tribes, and (with some
limitations) the state in which their reservation resides.
These overlapping sovereigns create unintended consequences, such as
an ineffective law enforcement scheme that leaves reservation residents
vulnerable to crime. 44 Indian status results in perhaps its most profound
and perplexing consequence with respect to criminal jurisdiction
determinations. 45 Under the current federal criminal jurisdiction scheme,
whether the tribe, federal prosecutors, or both can prosecute an accused
offender depends upon whether the victim or alleged perpetrator is defined
as "Indian".46 Under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), if the alleged
perpetrator is deemed "Indian," federal jurisdiction applies if the charged
offense is one enumerated in the MCA without respect to the Indian status
of the victim. 47

Federal jurisdiction may still apply under the Indian

Country Crimes Act (ICCA) if either the victim or accused is deemed
"Indian." ' 8 When both the accused and victim are Indian and the charges
do not include offenses under the MCA, the tribe has jurisdiction if the

4' 7 C.F.R. § 273.4(a)(3)(ii) (2014); 25 C.F.R.

(2012).
42 25

U.S.C.

§2007(f) (2012);

§§

26.1, 26.5 (2014); 25 U.S.C.

§§

4221-43

25 C.F.R. § 39.2 (2014).

43See Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public
Law 280,47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1639-49.
44See generally, Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, Tangled Up in Knots: How Continued Federal
JurisdictionOver Sexual Predators on Indian Reservations Hobbles Effective Law Enforcement to the
Detriment of Indian Women, 41 N.M.L. REV. 239 (2011).
41See id.at 240-59.
46

See id.

§ 1153 (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2006) (defining "Indian" for purposes of section
1153); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.02, at 742-43 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
41 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 738. The ICCA is aimed at
41 18 U.S.C.

interracial crime; thus it does not apply when both the victim and accused are Indian. Id at 738.
Further, the ICCA does not apply if the Indian accused has already been punished by the tribe. Id.

CONNECTICUTPUBLICINTEREST LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

offense took place in Indian Country.49 In those situations, the accused
faces punishment limited to a maximum penalty of three years
imprisonment, $15,000 fine, or both.5 ° Once the tribe imposes its
punishment, federal authority to punish the accused ceases. 51 This can
mean an Indian convicted of an offense under the ICCA can receive a
52
lesser punishment than a non-Indian prosecuted for the same offense.
However, if neither the victim nor the accused is Indian, and the offense is
not an MCA offense, state jurisdiction applies.53
Separate from the legal consequences of Indian status, Indian identity
may confer equally important social benefits. For those Indians who are
also tribal members, acceptance in the tribe is often closely linked to
ancestry and descent. "Indian tribes reflect the most intimate associations
in the human experience: they are, by definition, families. Indian tribes are
bound by bloodlines, clan identifiers, and kinship. Ancestry or descent
often constitutes the dominant factor in determining whether one belongs
to an Indian tribe., 5 4 Being defined as "Indian" permits an individual to
fully participate in the tribal community of their family and ancestors. For
day-to-day living, tribal membership determines whether an individual can
participate in tribal life at all and the extent of that participation. Tribal
membership:
may include voting rights, the right to run for and hold
tribal office, preferential hiring by the tribe, access to tribal
courts and subjection to tribal law, the right to receive
tribal social services, the right to receive revenues
generated by tribally-owned businesses, or the right to
share in distributions derived from the exploitation of
natural resources on or beneath tribal lands.55

49 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1978), supersededby statute, 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2) (2006), as recognized by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004); Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 694 (1990), supersededby statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (as stated in United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004)); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 756.
5025 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(c) (2012).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012) (noting that provision shall not apply "nor any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe").
52See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Painter-Thome,
supra note 45, at 281-82.
53 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 509.

14 S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of Freedmen's
Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 453 (2007) (citing Angela L. Riley, (Tribal)Sovereignty and
Illiberalism,95 CAL. L.REv. 799 (2007)).
" Id. at 403-04.
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That is not to say, however, that those persons who self-identify as
"Indian" without official recognition have no reason for doing so. Rather,
like with other culture or ethnic identity claims, Indian heritage or status
can carry other intangible, or "fuzzy," benefits that are often far more
important to individual satisfaction and self-identity. Broadly speaking,
cultural affiliation is often at the heart of how we see and define
ourselves-how we arrive at who we believe ourselves to be. 6 Human
beings seek belonging and individual identity. This sense of belonging is
often linked to-and informed by-presumed membership in or ancestry
from a particular ethnic, religious, or racial group.57 It is through these
cultural affiliations that we-in part-create our individual identities.58
There is a sense of belonging to a culture group, 59 and a feeling of kinship
and cohesion with relatives and ancestors. 60 Beyond these feelings of
belonging, perceived cultural identity and connection to others shapes
individual self-definition. 6 ' It is that sense of community or tie to others
that helps define our place in society and reinforces our self-definition. 62
As suggested by Warren's reliance on her family stories, often these
lore
cultural labels begin in childhood and build on familial ties. 63 Family
64
often shapes how "people feel about themselves and their past.,

III. DEFINING "INDIANS"
The Warren controversy highlights the general confusion between an
ethnographic or family-history-based claim of identity and a legal claim of
identity. But more than that, it also brings to light legitimate questions
regarding the authority to determine the authentic indicia of "Indianness."
Warren claimed the right to define her own identity based on her family
history and personal sense of self. To her detractors, Warren was doing
nothing more than claiming a heritage based on "high cheekbones" and
family lore. For that perceived transgression, critics accused her of ethnic
identity theft by claiming membership in a group to which she did not
belong. In seeking to bar her claim, however, her critics sought to impose
Consequently, those denying
their own definition of authenticity.
56See Karst, supranote 13, at 306-08.
57Id. at 306; see also Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different,
and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305, 306 (1990).
58Karst, supra note 13, at 308.
59NPR, supra note 9.
60Berger, supra note 29, at 26, 37.
61Karst, supra note 13, at 307.
62See id. Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1373, 1373 (2002).
63See Karst, supranote 13, at 309.
64

NPR,supra note 9.
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Warren's claim assert the authority to repossess something that is not theirs
to give or take.
Aside from politically manufactured outrage, the episode does expose
flaws in the current legal framework for authenticating Indian status and
allocating the benefits and burdens of being Indian in America.
Ultimately, how "Indian" is defined determines whether an individual is
eligible for government benefits, subject to tribal jurisdiction, or even
eligible to participate in various aspects of tribal life. 65 However, from the
first contact with Europeans, the meaning of "Indian" has been beset with
imprecision, misunderstanding, and conflicting notions of authenticity.
Indeed, as every school child knows, even the term "Indian" itself is a
misnomer resulting from Columbus's mistaken belief that he had landed in
the Indies.66

This imprecision continued past the colonial period, resulting in
definitions generated without input from indigenous people and a
distortion of Indian people and their lives. In early court decisions, the
Supreme Court variously referred to Indian people as "savage Indians,"
and "wild uncivilized Indians," "an inferior race of people," and "fierce
savages. 67 Not just culturally insensitive and racist, these definitions
resulted in the deprivation of Indians' rights and justified "practices of
genocide, exploitation, and colonization policies.' 68 While more recent
definitions are more likely to look to Indians themselves for meaning,
misunderstanding and incomplete information continue to confuse the
definition of Indian in U.S. law and culture.6 9

One reason for this continued confusion is the lack of a unified or
comprehensive definition of "Indian., 70 Rather than one definition, Indian
status is dependent upon myriad definitions throughout federal and tribal
law, as well as lay definitions that sometimes creep into legal opinions. 71
Moreover, Indian status can often depend on a combination of both federal
and tribal law.
For instance, while tribes determine individual
61

Sheffield, supra note 28, at 4; Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Basedand Membership-

Based Views of Indian TribalSovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PIrT. L. REV.
1, 80-81 (1993).
66 Larry Sager, RediscoveringAmerica: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native American Indian
Nations, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 745, 759 (1999); James B. Wadley, Indian Citizenship and the
Privilegesand Immunities Clauses of the United States Constitution:An Alternative to the Problems of
the FullFaith and Credit and Comity?, 31 S.ILL. U. L.J. 31, 52 (2006).
67 Sager, supranote 67, at 754.
68

Id. at 759.

69 See

id.at 754-62; see also Dussias, supra note 65, at 81.

70 Dussias, supra note 65, at 80.
71See Ray, supra note 55, at 399. Indian status may also depend on state laws. Id.However, that

topic is beyond the scope of this article, which is focused primarily on the interplay between federal

and tribal law.
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membership, federal law determines which tribes are recognized with full
tribal status.72 Similarly, while federal law determines which individuals
may qualify for benefits reserved for tribal members, tribal citizenship is
dependent on each tribe's laws.73
Despite the significance federal recognition of Indian status, there is no
single definition of "Indian" that spans all federal law.74 In fact, there are
more than thirty definitions of the term "Indian" in various federal
statutes.75 While ancestry is always important when "Indian" is used
ethnographically, its importance in legal determinations of Indian status
depends on the particular statute at issue. 76 Thus, federal definitions vary
depending on the relevant statute and the purpose for which Indian status is
claimed or alleged.77 Some statutes use a "racial" classification, or
biological definition, by defining Indian in terms of blood quantum.78
Others rely on a political basis, defining "Indian" based on membership in
a federally recognized tribe.7 9 Still others provide no definition, leaving
the courts to cobble together a definition as necessary. 80 While most
people are unlikely to encounter significant problems under this scheme,
for some the effect can be profound, resulting not only in concrete legal
consequences but also in a denial of ancestry and self-identity as the law
defines individuals in or out of Indian status. That denial can result in a
fractured identity where the legal question posed can render an individual
"Indian" in one circumstance, but not in another.
A. Self-Identification
As the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") notes, "there are major
differences ... when the term 'American Indian' is used in an ethnological
sense versus its use in a political/legal sense., 81 And generally speaking,
the legal consequences of Indian status do not flow from individual self72

Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:

Redressing the Genocidal Act of ForcingAmerican Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV.
BLACKLTR. L.J. 107, 140 (1999); see Ray, supra note 55, at 399.
73See Ray, supra note 55, at 399; Margo S.Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an
Answer to the Question at the Core ofFederalIndian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 278 (2001).
74See Brownell, supra note 73, at 278.
75Id.
76 See

Dussias, supranote 65, at 80-84.

77Sheffield, supra note 28, at 4; Dussias, supra note 65, at 81-84.
78 See

Dussias, supra note 65, at 81-84.

79Brownell, supra note 73, at 278.

" See id
81 Frequently Asked Questions, DEPT. INTERIOR,
http://perma.cc/S9T4-2D6Y (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
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identification but from a legal determination of Indian status.82
Nevertheless, self-identification is recognized in a few areas of federal law.
For instance, racial discrimination can be based on self-identification
or even the perception of "Indianness." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") prohibits employers from discriminating against an
employee based on the "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 8 3 Courts seem indifferent whether an American Indian seeks
protection under Title VII as a member of a race or on grounds of national
origin and adjudicate claims of discrimination on both grounds.8 4 While
claims between Indians and non-Indians appear to be based more on racial
discrimination, courts allow claims of bias based on distinct tribal
affiliation on the grounds of national origin.85
Under either basis, anti-discrimination statutes do not necessarily
require that the plaintiff be a member of the protected group. 8 6 Rather, a
claim may proceed where the discrimination arose from the defendant's
perception that the plaintiff is a member of a particular group.87
Consequently, adjudication of such claims can depend on the defendant's
definition of the group and whether that defendant thinks the plaintiff
meets that definition.88 Under this scheme, the plaintiff must then
"persuade the courts, not just that they have been subjected to
discrimination on the basis of someone's characterization of them in, say,
racial terms, but also that89they are qualified members of a group that, in
truth, qualifies as a race."

82See id

342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012).
84See Smith-Barrett v. Potter, 541 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding "the fact

that American Indian status has been protected on multiple grounds does not erode the viability" of an
American Indian's Title VII claim as a protected class member).
85 See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1124
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding hiring preferences given to members of the Navajo Nation over a member of
the Hopi Tribe was impermissible discrimination due to national origin).
86 Karst, supra note 13, at 326; see, e.g,. Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dept. of Utilities, 860 F. Supp.
1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994); see also Smith-Barrett,541 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citing the "dearth of case law"
regarding the required amount of "blood relationship" for membership in a protected class to support a
prima facie case of discrimination as reason not to impose "arbitrary threshold for tribal membership").
In Perkins, the court determined that the plaintiff held himself out as American Indian and perhaps
faced the "impossibility," as many Native Americans do, "of establishing unquestionable
genetic/hereditary classification." Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278. Ultimately, the fact the plaintiff's
employer believed the plaintiff to be a Native American was the most important reason in the District
Court's holding. Id.
87 Karst, supra note 13, at 326.
88
89

dat 326-27.
Id.at 326.
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Furthermore, the Census relies entirely on self-identification and does
not require validation of the racial category. 90 The Census defines
American Indian or Alaska Native as "a person having origins in any of the
original peoples of North and South America and who maintains tribal
affiliation or community attachment." 91 As might be expected, Census
data reveal that more people self-identify as "Indian" than the numbers
reflected in tribal rolls. For instance, in the 2010 Census, nearly 5.2
million people self-identified as "American Indian" or "Alaska native" on
Census forms. 92 However, more than two thirds of those self-identified
persons did not live on American Indian reservations, trust lands, Alaska
Native Villages, or other tribal lands.93 Of course, persons living apart
from Indian land may still be participating in tribal life.94 However, in
2005 fewer than half of those who identified as "American Indian" or
"Alaska Native" were enrolled members of any federally recognized
tribe. 95 The numbers from the 2010 Census appear to support the notion
that more people claim Indian heritage than actually participate in tribal
life. 96

90Brownell, supra note 73, at 276-77. Census data reveal that more people self-identify than the
numbers reflected in tribal rolls. For instance, in the 2010 Census, nearly 5.2 million people identified
"American Indian" or "Alaska Native." TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES, & ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010,2010 CENSUS BRIEFS, C2010BR-10,

at 1 (Jan. 2012). The report noted that "2.9 million identified as American Indian and Alaska Native
alone." Id. The remaining 2.3 million people identified "in combination with one or more other races."
Id. However, more than two-thirds of those self-identified persons did not live on American Indian
reservations, trust lands, Alaska Native Villages, or other tribal lands. Tina Noris, Paula Vines,
Elizabeth Hoeffel, Factsfor Features:American Indian andAlaska Native HeritageMonth, November

2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/SB2W-QHUK . Of course, persons living
apart from Indian land may still be participating in tribal life. Bill Donovan, Census: Navajo
7, 2011)
http://perma.cc/S5NY300,000, NAVAJOTIMES,
(July
Enrollment Tops
ZH74UqDLnWRDvCE. According to the Census, there are 332,129 Navajo, but the Navajo Nation
estimates its own population as 300,048; there are 819,105 Cherokee according to the Census, but the
Cherokee counts approximately 302,000 members. Id; NORRIS, VINES, & HOEFFEL, supra, at 18.
9' See NORRIS, VINES, & HOEFFEL, supra note 90, at 2. "[T]he American Indian and Alaska

Native population includes people who marked the 'American Indian or Alaska Native' checkbox or
reported entries such as Navajo, Blackfeet, Inupiat, Yup'ik, or Central American Indian groups or
South American Indian groups." Id.
92 Idat 1 The report noted that, "2.9 million identified as American Indian and Alaska Native
alone." Id. The remaining 2.3 million people identified "in combination with one or more other races."
Id.
9' Id. at 20.
94

Donovan, supra note 90.

95U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 2005 AMERiCANINDIANPOPULATIONAND

LABOR FORCE REPORT (2005); For example, according to the Census, 819,105 people identified
themselves as Cherokee on Census, but the Cherokee Nation estimates that it has less than half
(approximately 302,000) that number of members. Donovan, supra note 90.
96
NORRIS, VINES, & HOEFFEL, supra note 90, at 18. Less dramatically, there are 332,129 Navajo
according to Census numbers, but the Navajo Nation estimates its own population as 300,048. Id.
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Controversy over self-identification-based claims of Indian identity is
not limited to political gamesmanship.97 A naked claim to Indian ancestry,
without any proof, can rankle those who have been forced to prove their
status to the government or to a tribe.98 The idea that someone can opt to
be Indian may be contrary to the viewpoint of those Indian people who
consider being Indian "not [as] an affirmative choice of the individual, but
rather a condition of one's birth." 99 Perhaps even more importantly, selfidentification can make unclear what-if any--obligations the person has
towards Indian peoples or tribes.'00 For example, those Indians who reside
on reservations and participate in their tribe's social and cultural life may
view their efforts as ensuring tribal survival while other "wannabees"
claim Indian identity without the burden of contributing to tribal
survival. 01' This willingness to claim Indian heritage while avoiding the
difficulties that can accompany living in tribal communities has led to
some resentment from Indians. 02
Moreover, self-identification claims may be rife with inaccuracies or
driven by nothing more than a desire to belong to a particular culture
group. Worse, those self-identifying as Indian could be guilty of the very
"box checking" of which Elizabeth Warren was accused. According to the
Coalition of Bar Associations of Color, "box checking, or the fraudulent
claims of Indian identity in applications for higher education, has been
rampant in undergraduate and law school admissions."' 0 3 Based on the
Coalition's study, approximately 2,500 self-identified Indian students
graduated from law school between 1990 and 2000; but the 2000 Census
only reported an increase of 228 Indian lawyers during that same time
97See, e.g., Lee Romney, Abuses Mar Minority ContractingPrograms:Many firms are suspected
offalsely claiming special status. But enforcement is lax,punishment rare, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998
(describing controversy over company claiming status of ownership by an Indian woman under a
federal program that provides bidding preferences to minority-owned businesses); Richard Leiby, The
Legend of Lone Star Dietz: Redskins Namesake, Coach - and PossibleImpostor?, WASH. POST, Nov.
6, 2013 (noting that "Indian imposters were not unheard of at Carlisle [Indian Industrial School],
particularly once it gained renown as a football school" and that, despite its infamy, school "was a
destination for financially strapped but ambitious kids looking for a free education and a path to a
job"); Linda M. Waggoner, On Trial: The Washington R*dskins' Wily Mascon: Coach William "Lone
Star" Dietz, MONT.: MAG. OF W. HIST., Spring 2013 (describing trial of William "Lone Star" Dietz for
falsely claiming Indian identity to avoid military service during World War I, when Indian non-citizens
were exempt from military draft).
98 NPR, supranote 9, at 3.

99 Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirementsfor Indian Nations, 50
KAN. L. REV. 437, 464 (2002).
100 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Slavery, Free Blacks and Citizenship, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 48991(2013).
101Goldberg, supra note 99, at 465-66.
102

103

id.

Francis Wilkinson, Elizabeth Warren's Cherokee Nation, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2012),

http://perma.cc/8KBS-G683
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period.104 From this, the Coalition concluded "that a large percentage of
individuals in law school who identified themselves on their law school
applications as Native American, were not of Native American heritage
and in fact had no affiliation either politically, racially, or culturally with
the Native American community. ' 1°5
B. BiologicalDefinitions
Generally, federal law does not rely on unsubstantiated claims of
Indian identity. Rather, federal benefits are generally contingent on an
Indian person meeting the more rigorous definition of "Indian" embodied
in the U.S. Code. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA") was an
early legislative attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of "Indian",
which defined "Indian" to include:
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and
all persons who are descendants of such members who were,
on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of
include all other
any Indian reservation, and shall further
10 6
persons of one-half or more Indian blood.
Through this definition, the IRA created three separate criteria by
07
which an individual could qualify for Indian status under federal law.'
While only the last criteria explicitly included blood quantum, the
requirement of Indian "descent" in the first two criteria codified the notion
that Indian status is determined at least in part by biology. 10 8 The first
criterion relies on political affiliation through tribal membership, but pairs
that with a descent requirement. Similarly, the second criterion recognizes
those nonmember Indians who reside on reservation lands but who
nonetheless have some degree of Indian ancestry. By relying on descent or
blood quantum, the IRA effectively excluded those persons without the
requisite degree of blood quantum from the definition of "Indian".109 In
this way, federal law codified blood quantum as proxy for Indian identity
with the passage of the IRA.110
104Id

'0' COALITION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS

OF COLOR RESOLUTIONS

2011,

RESOLUTION ON

ACADEMIC ETHNIC FRAUD (July 20, 2011), http://perma.cc/BU8C-QWQB.
10625 U.S.C. § 479 (2012).
..
7 See Brownell, supra note 73, at 285.
108

See Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum inFederalIndianLaw to 1935, 51 S.D.

L. REv. 4, 10-11 (2006).
09

'

Id. at47.

110Indian Reorganization Act (1934) 48 Stat. 984, 984-88 (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§
461-79 (2006)). Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984, 984-88 (codified
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Following the IRA, many federal statutes incorporated blood or
ancestry in whole or in part in defining Indian status."' Today, the BIA
and other federal regulations rely-to varying degrees-on blood quantum
to determine Indian status. 11 2 Generally, federal benefits require onequarter to one-half Indian "blood" for eligibility." 3 The "ticket" to many
BIA services is an identity card--called a Certificate of Degree of Indian
Blood-that lists the person's blood quantum. 1 14 Consequently, the
requirement for federal benefits often comes down to a set percentage of
Indian blood." 5
One advantage of relying on blood quantum to determine eligibility for
benefits is that it permits people of Indian descent who are not enrolled
tribal members to receive benefits designed for Indian persons. For
instance, nontribal members might receive education benefits based on
blood quantum without respect to their tribal enrollment status, thus
granting a traditionally marginalized group access to higher education they
might otherwise be unable to afford.
Despite the appearance of scientific authority, reliance on biological
markers is also troubling. First, genetic markers do not necessarily confer
a "shared culture or historical narrative." ' 1 6 Thus, blood quantum criteria
may be inconsequential to tribal identity. 117 Further, if the federal blood
quantum is higher than what is required by any individual tribe, then
reliance on a federal blood quantum can exclude Indians who have
otherwise been accepted as tribal members. Many tribes do not have a
blood quantum requirement. Thus, reliance on such a measure would
exclude those tribes' members.
as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2006)). Prior to the iRA's passage, blood quantum had been used in
some treaties to determine certain rights under the treaty, but even in those cases, it was not used to
determine tribal membership. Spruhan, supra note 108, at 10-11. It was with passage of the IRA that
its use became widespread to determine eligibility for federal benefits. Id. at 46-47. Blood quantum
was also used in earlier federal statutes. For instance, in 1918, the Indian Appropriations Act prohibited
the use of nontreaty appropriations "to educate children of less than one-fourth Indian blood whose
parents are citizens of the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 297 (1918).
"' E.g., Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1988) (including
ancestry as possibly qualifying individual for participation in health professions recruitment or
scholarship programs); The Indian Education Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2651(4) (1988) (defining Indian
to include "a descendant, in the first or second degree, of' a tribal "member (as defined by an Indian
tribe, band, or other organized group) of such Indian tribe, band, or other organized group of Indians");
The Native American Languages Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 2902(2); see also Brownell, supra note 73,
at 280.
112See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 5.1, 40.1, 151.2(c)(3), 31.1, 32.4(z), 36.3, 81.1(i) (2014).
113
Spruhan, supranote 108, at 47; Porter, supranote 72, at 140.
114Brownell,

supra note 73, at 281.

115Spruhan, supranote 108, at 47; Porter, supranote 72, at 140.
16

Carl Elliott & Paul Brodwin, Identity and Genetic Ancestry Tracing, 325 BRrr. MED. J. 1469,

1469-70 (2002).
1

17Id.
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Moreover, reliance on blood quantum raises questions about equal
protection when benefits are seemingly allocated on the basis of racial or
ethnic descent.
The tendency to link race to blood quantum is
understandable given the use of blood quantum in the racial history of the
United States.' 18 Nevertheless, despite the importance of blood quantum or
ancestry in defining Indian status, the Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that benefits are race-based and violate equal protection. 119 In
Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld an Indian hiring preference
that required tribal membership and one-quarter blood quantum against an
equal protection claim. 120 The case involved a section of the IRA that
granted a hiring preference for "Indians" over equally qualified "nonIndians" in filling vacancies in the BIA.121 The purpose of this and similar
preferences "has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own
self-government; to further the Government's trust obligation toward the
Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians
administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.' 22
Finding that the hiring criteria were based on political rather than racial
classification, the Court held that Indians were granted a preference "as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities. ,,123toteCutth
According to the Court, the
preference was not a racial preference but an "employment criterion
reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to
make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. 99124
In that way, it was similar to residency requirements for political officeholders. 25 Consequently, the Court held that the criteria "[w]as not
directed toward a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians"' but "only to
members of 'federally recognized' tribes.' 26 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that the BIA procedure manual required that only those
with "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and . . .member[s] of a

18 Karst, supra note 13,

at 271.

'19
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (finding hiring preference political, not
racial classification, because it applied only to Indians who were members of federally recognized
tribes, and not to persons who were not members of a recognized tribe who might be classified racially
as Indians); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (concluding that "respondents were
not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are
enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe").
20 Mancari,417 U.S. at 554.
121
Id.at 537.
122
Id.at 541-42.
123
Id.at 554.
124 id.

125 Id. ("The preference is similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States

Senator, when elected, be 'an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen,' Art. I, § 3, cl.3, or
that a member of a city council reside within the city governed by the council.").
'26
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).

CONNECTICUTPUBLIC INTEREST LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

Federally-recognized tribe" were eligible for the preference. 127 Despite the
clear inclusion of a particular blood quantum requirement, the Court
concluded the criteria would "exclude many individuals who are racially to
be classified as 'Indians,"' because they were not enrolled tribal
members.1 28 Thus, "the preference [was] political rather than racial in
nature. 129
C. PoliticalDefinitions
Reflecting Mancari's description of "Indians" as "members of discrete,
recognized, political entities" as opposed to "members of a particular
race, ' 130 most federal statutes define "Indian" based on membership in a
federally recognized tribe.131 Under this definition, benefits flow from
tribal membership on account of the "special trust and government-togovernment relationships [that] entail certain legally enforceable
obligations and responsibilities on the part of the United States to persons
who are enrolled members of such tribes., 132 It is that government-togovernment relationship, including the federal trust responsibility and
treaty obligations that give rise to Indians' benefits and obligations under
federal law. 133 Consequently, many federal statutes incorporate tribal
134
membership in their definitional criteria for "Indian" status.
127Id. at 553 n.24. Interestingly, this definition expanded the number of persons eligible for the
preference by lowering the blood-quantum requirement to one-quarter, from the IRA's one-half. See
id.

128 id.

129Id.;

see also Brownell, supra note 73, at 295-98 (discussing use of blood quantum in definition

of "Indian" in regulations regarding hiring preference). Similarly, in an appeal of the dismissal of a
violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), the Eighth Circuit ruled on a claim of selective
racial prosecution by a non-member of a recognized tribe. U.S. v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th
Cir. 1999). The Court held membership in a recognized tribe was the deciding factor in bringing the
charges rather than race. Id. Members of recognized Indian tribes are allowed to hunt protected birds
under the MBTA. Id. However, the exemption did not apply to all Native Americans and was
contingent upon tribal membership. Id.As a result, no racial discrimination occurred. Id.at 1139.
130
Wadley, supra note 66, at 53.
131It is important to recognize that federal programs benefitting Indian people are not premised on
remediating past discrimination or ill treatment. Rather, these benefits and obligations flow from the
government-to-government relationship, as exemplified in various treaties that set out specific rights
and obligations, and the federal government's trust responsibility.
132U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF INDIAN, supranote 81; Dussias, supra note 65, at 80.
133U.S.DEP'T

OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 81; Dussias, supra note 65, at 80.

114 E.g., Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 1603(13)
(2012); Indian
Education Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2651(4) (A) (repealed 1994); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §
2902(2) (2012); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (2012); Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(b) (2012); Tribally Controlled Colleges and
University Assistance Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1) (2012); National Indian Forest Resources
Management Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3103(9) (2012); Indian Child Protection and Family Violence
Prevention Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3202(6) (2012). Other statutes accept membership as establishing
Indian status, but also include individuals recognized as Indian by, for example, the Interior Secretary,
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For federal statutes that rest on tribal membership, the criteria vary
from tribe to tribe.13 5 Absent congressional intervention, the Supreme
Court has recognized a tribe's right to employ whichever criteria it deems
appropriate to determine membership. 3 6 Tribes may base membership on
blood quantum, "maternal or paternal descent, residency on the
reservation, community participation, vote of the tribal council, community
recognition or parental enrollment, performance of certain annual duties to
the tribe, appearance of ancestors137on specified base rolls, and marriage to
or adoption by a tribal member."'
Unfortunately, reliance on tribal membership does not necessarily
clarify matters. Just as tribal enrollment criteria differ from tribe to tribe,
"[e]ligibility requirements for federal services... differ from program to
program.' ' 138 As important as tribal membership can be in determining
Indian status, it is not necessarily dispositive or clear-cut. For instance,
persons who are members of terminated tribes or unrecognized tribes will
fail to qualify as "Indian" under most federal laws. 139 Similarly, those who
are not ethnically Indian but are nonetheless tribal members through
adoption may be able to participate in some aspects of tribal life, while still
not being sufficiently "Indian" under federal statutes.14 0 Further, a person
can be deemed "Indian" under federal law even if she or he is not
recognized by a tribe. Thus, while most benefits are available to members
of federally-recognized tribes, some benefits are available to Indians who
are not enrolled tribal members. 141 For example, the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act of 1990 ("IACA") makes it illegal to market or sell arts and crafts
items by falsely claiming the items were crafted by an Indian artisan or
were the product of a particular Indian tribe, Indian arts and craft
Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (2012), or certified by an Indian tribe, Indian Arts
and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(1) (2012). Regulatory definitions also rely on tribal membership to
define Indian status. E.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 32.2(m), 39.2(n), 45.4(r), 271.2(i), 272.2(k), 273.2(0), 274.3(k),
275.2(g) & 277.3(h) (1992) (cited in Dussias, supra note 65, at 83 n.346).
135 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (recognizing tribes' sole

authority to determine own membership as consistent and legitimate exercise of tribal sovereignty);
Ray, supra note 54, at 399.
136This

authority is not reviewable by the federal courts, even if the membership criteria would

otherwise violate the equal protection clause. See Martinez, 436 U.S.

at 72 (1978) (refusing to

intervene in tribe's membership decision that excluded children of female members who married
outside tribe while admitting children born to male tribal members who married outside tribe); Ray,
supra note 54, at 403.
137Ray, supranote 54, at 403.
138 U.S.

DEP'T INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81.

139Brownell,

supra note 73, at 277.

140Id.

141See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting "that unenrolled

Indians are eligible for a wide range of federal benefits directed to persons recognized by the Secretary
of Interior as Indians without statutory reference to enrollment.") (emphasis in original).
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organization, or Indian person. While the IACA defines "Indian" to
include tribal members, it also includes individuals certified as Indian
artisans by an Indian tribe. Other statutes similarly include membership as
a partial or optional criteria.
Nevertheless, even defining Indian status through tribal membership
can implicate race-or at least its proxy; blood quantum. 142 First, "[t]he
federal government ... possesses power to define tribal membership...
[and] [w]hile numerous federal regulations accept membership in a
federally recognized tribe as a sufficient indicum [sic]of Indian ethnicity,
others require a minimum blood quantum" as well. 143 Consequently, for
tribes without a minimal blood quantum requirement, blood quantum
became proxy for tribal status in federal law. 44 Furthermore, federal
recognition of tribal status requires Indian tribes to make "descen[t] from a
historical Indian tribe" a condition of membership.145 However, under the
federal recognition process, while a group seeking recognition must be
comprised of "American Indians, groups of descendants will not be
acknowledged solely on a racial basis. Maintenance of tribal relations-a
political relationship-is indispensable.' 46
Further, tribal membership rules often incorporate some minimal blood
quantum requirement. 147 In 1991, the BIA reported that more than fourfifths of federally recognized Indian tribes outside of California and
Oklahoma "conditioned membership on proof of tribal blood.' 4 8 The
requisite blood quantum can range from one-half to one sixty fourth degree
of Indian blood. 149 In addition, "even among tribes that the BIA reports as
not requiring proof of a particular blood quantum, membership nonetheless
requires evidence that either or both parents are tribal members, or that the
applicant's forebears appeared on tribal rolls." 150 Consequently, tribes are
comprised of members whose eligibility may rest on biological or cultural
conditions.' 5 1 In other words, tribes may be political entities, but they can
also be racial 2or ethnic groups in their reliance on biology to determine
5
membership.
142See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1389.
143

L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV.

702, 723 (2001).
'44 Spruhan, supra note 108, at 47.
145See
146 43

25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e) (2013).

Fed. Reg. 39, 361 (Aug. 24, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. § 83).

147No

tribe requires one hundred percent blood quantum. Brownell, supranote 73, at 309.

148Gould,

supra note 143, at 721.

149Brownell,

supra note 73, at 308.

150Gould, supra note 143, at 722.
151See Ray, supra note 54, at 39-95.
152 See

id It is also true that some tribes admit members through adoption and others have no
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Despite the role of ancestry in determining tribal membership conflicts
still arise in which individuals of Indian ancestry have been denied legal
status because they were not enrolled members of a recognized tribe.153
For instance, those tribes that trace membership to the Dawes Rolls must
contend with the likelihood that those rolls are incomplete. In some cases,
individual Indians deliberately chose not to be included. 154 In others, the
government may have simply been unable to reliably include every eligible
person spread across the continental United States using data collection
techniques available in the 1800s. 15 5 Still others may have been
intentionally excluded by a Dawes's census worker.1 56 As Rennard
Strickland explained, whether someone is deemed an Indian under federal
law "may have nothing to do with who you are, how you live, what you do,
what your beliefs are; it has to do with the marriage and tribal enrollment
patterns of your parents or grandparents as interpreted by federal
bureaucrats. 157
As a consequence of the gaps in the Dawes Rolls and reliance on tribal
membership, ethnic Indians who are not affiliated with a tribe are ineligible
for tribal-based benefits. For the purposes of Mancari, this solidifies the
Court's notion that race is not, in fact, the basis on which tribal benefits are
conferred. Thus, those persons claiming Indian identity may be denied
benefits as a consequence of not being enrolled tribal members. This is
because, broadly speaking, benefits are conferred on the basis of tribal
membership as part of the government-to-government relationship between
various Indian tribes and the United States. 158 Thus, while many

descent or blood quantum requirement at all. Brownell, supra note 73, at 308.
153Wadley, supra note 66, at 53.
154See Ray, supra note 54, at 440 ("To the extent that biological Cherokees refused to grant
legitimacy to the Dawes Rolls by participating in enrollment, the Rolls are incomplete and therefore

cannot serve as an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by 'blood."').
155
NPR, supra note 9.
156See

Ray, supra note 54, at 395 ("[A]lthough many of the Freedmen or their descendants at the

time of enrollment may in fact have had Native American ancestry, such lineage was not recognized by
the agents of the Dawes Commission, who consistently enrolled these '[B]lack Indians' under the
Freedmen Roll."); id. at 437 ("[T]he Freedmen's roll systematically excluded evidence of Native
American ancestry, and agents refused to record it, even when proffers of proof of 'Indian blood' were
made by enrollees themselves."); id at 438 ("Because the Freedmen's roll systematically omits proof
of Cherokee ancestry where such ancestry could be established by independent evidence, and because

there is no other Dawes roll on which such ancestry can appear, the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and
therefore cannot serve as an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by 'blood."').
157 Brownell, supra note 73, at 302 (quoting Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in
Native American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 330

(1998)).
' COHEN'S HANDBOOK § 1.01, at 8 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) ("The centuries-old
relationship between the United States and Indian nations is founded upon historic government-to-

government dealings and a long-held recognition of Indians' special legal status.").
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individuals may identify as ethnically Indian, without tribal membership
they are ineligible for tribal benefits.
Moreover, because tribal membership decisions are largely the result
of a political process, those who are culturally or biologically Indian may
nonetheless be excluded for reasons that have nothing to do with ancestry.
Simply put, they may be subjected to decisions that are based more on
politics than any neutral criteria. This has often been the charge made by
many groups removed from tribal rolls or declined enrollment status.
Tribal membership decisions have
been a well-publicized source of
159
controversy for more than a decade.
Most recent disputes over membership-in particular the exclusion of
tribal members by enrollment committees-have arisen under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under IGRA, individuals may challenge
a tribe's decision to admit or exclude someone who has applied for tribal
160
membership. IGRA does not include any definition of Indian and
federal courts have generally accepted the tribe's membership
determination in disputes arising under IGRA. 16 1 For instance, Indian
tribes in California have removed thousands of people from their
membership rolls. 162 As a consequence of these membership decisions,
Indian families have been divided and individuals separated from their
tribe and culture. 163 Many have also lost their jobs, homes, and their share
164
in the revenues generated by the billion-dollar Indian casino industry.
Repeatedly, federal courts hold that they have no jurisdiction to review the
tribe's enrollment decision. 65 This is true even in troubling cases where
applicants appear to meet enrollment criteria and the denial of their
"9 See generally, Suzianne D. Painter-Thome, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving Tribal
Sovereignty in the Face of Indian Casinos & the New Premium on Tribal Membership, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 311 (2010).
160See 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1992).
161

In contrast, the Department of Interior has asserted that it has "broad and possibly

nonreviewable authority" to review tribal membership criteria. According to the Department, it would
reject a tribe's attempt to define membership to include those persons of Indian descent who did not
maintain any tribal connection. Brownell, supra note 73, at 307.
162 Kevin Fagan, Tribes Toss Out Members In High-Stakes Quarrel,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2008,
http://perma.cc/A6LK-MMP2.
163 Marc Cooper, Tribal Flush: Pechanga People "Disenrolled"en Masse, LA WEEKLY, Jan. 3,
2008, http://perma.cc/8ED8-BY8S; David Kelly, Clan Says Tribe Dealt It a Bad Hand; A Family Finds
Itself Cut Offfrom the Pechanga Group and Its Casino Wealth Despite Long Ties to the Reservation,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 1; see also Painter-Thorne, supra note 159; Onell R. Soto, Tribe Denies
50 Members Profits from Casino: San Pasqual Band Says Some Lack Indian Blood, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (June 28, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/5VDC-9MVS; James May, State Capitol
Rally Protest Disenrollments,INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 21, 2004, http://http://perma.cc/GF2L-

$9W6.
164See

generally Painter-Thorne, supra note 159.

165See

generally id.
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enrollment separates families. For instance, in Lewis v. Norton, the
plaintiffs who met the tribe's blood quantum requirement were the children
of an enrolled member of the Table Mountain Rancheria. 166 The district
court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the children indeed met the
tribe's membership criteria. 167 Nonetheless, the court refused to intervene,
finding that the plaintiffs could not "survive the double jurisdictional
whammy of sovereign immunity and lack of federal court jurisdiction to
intervene in tribal membership disputes.' 68
D. Undefined
Finally, many federal statutes do not define "Indian" at all. In the
absence of a statutory definition, courts are left to define Indian without
legislative guidance. More concerning, many courts craft definitions
without tribal input and irrespective of tribal beliefs or custom.
Consequently, court-generated definitions may rest on racial, political, or
cultural grounds that may have little to no relevance to the particular Indian
tribe. 169 Furthermore, when identity is left to legal decision-making, "legal
pronouncements undermine the Indian identities of individuals who cannot
satisfy outsiders' notions of cultural participation."' 170 The failure to meet
non-Indian criteria for "Indianness" can mean the loss of legal rights and
obligations derived from tribal membership and Indian status. 171
In two early cases addressing the definition of "Indian," the Supreme
Court relied on a cultural definition of Indian, reaching two contrary
conclusions whether the Pueblo people of New Mexico are an Indian
tribe.1 72 In the first case, United States v. Joseph, decided in 1876, the
Court found that the Pueblo were not Indian. 173 Joseph involved a land
dispute, specifically whether the Trade and Intercourse Acts that prohibited
settlement of non-Indians on "Indian" land applied to the Pueblo. 174 To
answer that question, the Court first had to determine whether "the people
who constitute the pueblo or village of Taos [are] an Indian tribe within the
meaning of the statute.' 175 According to the Court, the Pueblo people were
166Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 960-961 (9th Cir. 2005).
167
Id.
168Id

169See discussion, infra, p. 13.

170
Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1373.
171Id.at 1375.
172United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 614, 615-16 (1877); United States v. Sandoval, 231

U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
173
Joseph, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 614.
174
id.
171
Id.at 615.
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"Indians only in feature complexion, and a few of their habits," but not
actually Indians for the purposes of the Nonintercourse Act.176 Thus,
non77
Indians could settle on Pueblo land as part of westward expansion.
Thirty-seven years later, in United States v. Sandoval, the Court
reached the opposite conclusion. 178 The federal government prosecuted
Sandoval for bringing alcohol into the Santa Clara Pueblo in violation of
federal law prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquor into Indian
Country. 179 Sandoval challenged his conviction on the ground that he
could not have violated the Act because the Pueblo were not an Indian
tribe. 80 Relying on Joseph, the territorial court agreed with Sandoval and
held the Pueblo were not "Indian" within the meaning of a statute
regulating liquor sales to Indian tribes. 18 1 After that decision, Congress
passed the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910 requiring that New Mexico
prohibit alcohol sales in Indian Country, which it defined as including
Pueblo lands. 82 In reviewing the territorial court's decision, the Court
relied on that congressional action to find that Congress intended the
Pueblo peoples to be included in the definition of Indian. 183 Nevertheless,
the Court went beyond that conclusion to consider whether the Pueblo met
the definition of Indian. 84 Consequently, the Court rejected its decision in
Joseph, concluding that it incorrectly rested on the factual impressions of
the territorial court.185 Instead, the Court held that the Pueblo were
"Indians in race, customs, and domestic government."' 186 Because the
176Id.at 616.
177Id. at 619.
178 United

States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913). Sandoval was, of course, reasonable in this
assertion given the Court's holding in Joseph. However, the Court explained away any seeming
contradiction. Acknowledging that its decision was "not in accord" with what was said in Joseph, the
Court distinguished the two cases. First, it contended that Joseph-which involved a prohibition on the
sale of Indian land without federal approval-did not turn on Congress's authority to regulate Indians
or their property. Id.Second, the Trade and Intercourse Acts involved in Joseph were not nearly as
comprehensive as the statute prohibiting alcohol sales on Indian lands at issue in Sandoval. Id.at 4849. Further, according to the Court, Joseph was undermined by its reliance on the opinions of the
territorial court, which the Court found were at odds with new information on the habits of the Pueblo
now available in Washington, DC. Id. at 49. Thus, the Court could not say that the Pueblo were beyond
Congress's reach. Accordingly, it was illegal to sell alcohol to the Pueblo because, "although
industrially superior, they are intellectually and morally inferior to many of them; and that they are easy
victims to the evils and debasing influence of intoxicants." Id.at 41.
179
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 36 (1913).
10

" Id. at 47-48.
1. Id. at 32-33.
112Id. at

36-37.

183Id. at 38; see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 241

n.8 (1985).
184Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38-46.
15

1Id.at 48-49.

86

1

1d. at39.
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Pueblo were Indians, the Court deemed them an "inferior race," in need 1of
87
special consideration and protection like other Indian communities.
Thus, the defendant's conviction for selling liquor on Indian lands stood.
One reason courts rely on culture is to avoid equal protection concerns
188
if Indian status were solely determined on the basis of race.
Nevertheless, while supposedly avoiding race as a determination for Indian
status, "state and federal courts continue to characterize Native North
Americans as a racial group and still use this characterization to justify and
support denying them their rights.,

189

Because the use of race triggers

scrutiny, 19°

strict
individuals are thus forced to prove their "Indianness" by
meeting cultural indicia
identified by the court. 191 Otherwise, their rights
192
as Indians will be lost.

More broadly, courts have been left to define Indian in cases with farreaching consequences. Despite the importance of Indian status in
determining jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country, neither statute
193
establishing federal jurisdiction actually includes a definition of Indian.
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country largely depends whether an
individual-either the victim or the accused-is "Indian" within the
meaning of the Indian Major Crimes Act (MCA) or the Indian Country
Crimes Act (ICCA). 194 The MCA granted federal jurisdiction over certain
major crimes' 95 committed by Indians in Indian Country. 196 Thus, the
defendant's Indian status is an element of the offense under section 1153,
and must be alleged by the prosecution and established beyond a
87

1 id.

188See generallyMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also discussion supra pp. 158-59
189See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1375.
190See e.g., In re Santos Y., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that strict

scrutiny applies "[a]bsent social, cultural, and political relationships [between an Indian child and its
tribe], or where the relationships are very attenuated"); see generally Goldberg, supra note 62.
191
See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1375.
192See id

193See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (2006); see also Dussias, supra note 65, at 81.
194United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2009).
195The

Major Crimes Act grants federal jurisdiction over the following offenses:

[M]urder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A,
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child
abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this
title within the Indian country[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006).
196 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the
Jurisdictional Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 1, 6 (2009).
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reasonable doubt.197 The ICCA 198 confers federal jurisdiction on all
violations of "the general laws of the United States" in Indian Country
committed either by or against a non-Indian. 199 Because the ICCA seeks to
address "interracial crime," it does not apply when both victim and accused
are Indian.2 °° In a prosecution under section 1152, Indian status is an
affirmative defense generally raised by a defendant seeking to avoid
federal jurisdiction by proving that neither or both the victim and accused
are Indian.2° ' Under section 1152, Indian status must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.20 2
Because neither section 1153 nor 1152 defines "Indian, '' 20 3 courts have
determined Indian status on an ad hoc basis. To determine whether
jurisdiction is proper, courts have generally followed the test first set out in
1846, in United States v. Rogers.2 °4 There, the defendant, William Rogers,
sought to avoid federal prosecution on charges of murdering Jacob
Nicholson. 20 5 Rogers contended that, because he voluntarily resided on the
Cherokee land, had no intention to return to the United States, was able to
exercise all the rights and privileges as any tribal member, and had been
incorporated and adopted by the tribe, he was "Indian."' 20 6 Rogers used
similar facts to allege that his victim, Nicholson, was also Cherokee. 0 7
According to Rogers, because the statute at issue 20 8 did not provide

197United
198Also

States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).
known as the General Crimes Act. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 47, § 9.02, at 731,

n.5 (2005).
199 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
200

COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 47, § 9.02, at 734. If both the

victim and accused are non-Indian, state jurisdiction applies. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.

621, 624 (1881) (finding that despite ICCA initial recognition of federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-Indians, state jurisdiction took over upon statehood); accordCOHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 47 § 9.02, at 738, 754-55.
201 United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Beasley, 346
F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that affirmative defense elements must be established by
preponderance of evidence absent specific statutory standard).
202 Hester,719 F.2d at 1043; Beasley, 346 F.3d at 935.
203 See

18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (2006); see also United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762

(8th Cir. 2009).
204United

States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846).

205 Id. at 571.
206 id.
207

Id.

208 The specific statute at issue in Rogers was § 25 of the Act of June 30, 1834, a precursor to the
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which was enacted twenty years later. COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 47, § 9.02, at 731.
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accused and victim were "Indian," federal
jurisdiction when both the
2 9
jurisdiction was improper. 0
Disagreeing, the Supreme Court held that a white adult could not
become "Indian" through adoption even if, through that adoption he
became "entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and [had made] himself
amenable to their laws and usages., 210 Rather, Indian status was reserved
for those persons "belonging to [the Indian] race., 21 ' In so ruling, the
Court rejected any implication that Congress would have intended for the
jurisdictional exemption to apply to persons who would likely seek out its
protection to avoid responsibility to the laws of the United States.21 2
Under Rogers, an individual is considered an "Indian" if she (1) has
some quantity of Indian blood and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a
federally recognized tribe or by the federal government.213 The first prong
of the Rogers test appears to incorporate a biological basis through the use
of blood quantum.214 Under the first prong, it is not enough to show that
an individual is an enrolled tribal member. Rather, there must be some
connection of that individual's bloodline to a federally-recognized tribe.
For instance, in Zepeda, the Ninth Circuit considered only the first prongwhether the defendant had a sufficient blood tie to a federally-recognized
tribe in a prosecution under the MCA. The circuit court concluded that an
enrollment certificate was insufficient to establish the requisite blood tie
under the first prong of the Rogers test. At trial, prosecutors had entered a
"Gila River Enrollment/Census Office Certified Degree of Indian Blood"
certificate as evidence of Indian status. The certificate indicated that the
defendant had a "Blood Degree" of "1/4 Pima [and] 1/4 Tohono
O'Odham" for a total of 1/2 blood quantum (his Indian blood was from
father, his mother was Mexican). This certificate was sufficient to establish
209

Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); COHEN's HANDBOOK,

supra note 47, § 9.02, at 738, 741.
210 Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
211

id.

("And it would perhaps be found difficult to preserve peace among them, if white men of
every description might at pleasure settle among them, and, by procuring an adoption by one of the
212 Id.

tribes, throw off all responsibility to the laws of the United States, and claim to be treated by the

government and its officers as if they were Indians born. It can hardly be supposed that Congress
intended to grant such exemptions, especially to men of that class who are most likely to become

Indians by adoption, and who will generally be found the most mischievous and dangerous inhabitants
of the Indian country.").
2Id.
at 572-73. While this definition was crafted with respect to criminal prosecutions under
sections 1152 and 1153, courts have also applied it to cases involving the Indian Civil Rights Act. See

e.g., Connecticut v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1997); Brownell, supra note 73, at 284. This is
because the ICRA defines Indian as "any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18, [United States Code] if that person were to commit an
offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that section applies." 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
214 See

Sebastian, 701 A.2d at 24.
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Zepeda was eligible for tribal benefits and federal benefits based on tribal
membership. Nevertheless, tribal enrollment was deemed insufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Rogers test.2215 According to the Ninth
Circuit while "tribal enrollment is 'the common evidentiary means of
establishing Indian status,'...it is not the only means nor is it necessarily
determinative.

2 16

The second prong of the Rogers tests suggests that an individual does
not have to be an enrolled tribal member, but merely "recognized" as
Indian by a federally-recognized tribe or by U.S. government.217 However,
the relevant tribe must be federally recognized for a person to be deemed
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 218 Further, the Department of
Justice requires that a defendant be an enrolled tribal member to fall under
section 1153.219

The purpose of the second prong is to discern "whether the Native
American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly sovereign
people. 22° Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the notion that
221
tribal enrollment alone was sufficient to establish criminal jurisdiction.
Acknowledging that reliance on enrollment would "provide[] a simpler
framework within which we might judge Indian status as a political
affiliation with a formerly sovereign people," the court nevertheless
concluded that it was "bound by the body of case law which holds that

215 Somewhat

confusingly, the court did find that both "Gila River Indian Community of the Gila

River Indian Reservation, Arizona" and the "Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona" were federallyrecognized. However, because the record did not include evidence that "Tohono O'odham" referenced
in the enrollment certificate was the same as the "Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona" the court
concluded the two were not the same. The BIA had only recognized the "Tohono O'odham Nation of
Arizona." In contrast, "Tohono O'odham" was not recognized, but was simply a term used to refer to a
collective population, some of whom reside in Mexico. Because the record did not contain facts to
support finding that Zepeda had bloodline from federally-recognized tribe, no rational juror could have
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under section 1153.
216 See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Driver, 755 F.Supp. 885, 888 & n.7
(D.S.D. 1991), aft'd, 945 F.2d 1410, 1416 (8th Cir. 1991).
217United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.7 (1977) (noting that "enrollment in an official
tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction, at least where the Indian
defendant lived on the reservation and 'maintained tribal relations with the Indians thereon."'); Bruce,
394 F.3d at 1232 (applying Rogers test to 18 U.S.C. § 1152); United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 842
(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Bruce test also applies to 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
210 See Sebastian, 701 A.2d at 33.
219Brownell, supra note 73, at 283.
220 See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224.
221See id.. at 1225.
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indeed, even eligibility therefor, is not dispositive of
enrollment, and,
222
status.,
Indian
Thus, in determining whether an individual meets the second prong of
the test, courts generally rely on the following four factors: "(1) tribal
enrollment; (2) government recognition formally and informally through
receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; (3) enjoyment of the benefits
of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as an Indian through
residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life. '223
It can be enough that the person is treated as an Indian by the tribe.224
Proof of sufficient ties to permit jurisdiction might include being subject to
tribal police or court jurisdiction, receiving medical care from a tribal
hospital,225 participation in sacred tribal rituals, being born and/or residing
on an Indian reservation, having children who are enrolled tribal
members, 22627asserting Indian identity to government officials,227 or publicly
holding oneself out as Indian.228 However, it does not include mere
eligibility for tribal benefits because eligibility alone would make tribal
status dispositive, which Bruce precludes. 229 Further, minimal participation
in tribal social life may not be sufficient to establish Indian status under
section 1153.230

In a state court ruling, a defendant appealed his conviction under state
law on the ground that Wyoming lacked jurisdiction over him on as an
Indian acting on a reservation.231 In the facts stipulated to by both parties,
222See id. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has held enrolled tribal membership is dispositive while
non-enrollment is not necessarily determinative. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir.
2009).
223 United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 763; United
States v. Ramirez, 537 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008); Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224; United States v.
Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting circuit and state courts use Rogers test); United
States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th
Cir. 1995); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
224 See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225-26.
225 E.g., Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 766; Keys, 103 F.3d at 761.
226 E.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1226-27 (finding prior arrests by tribal police sufficient to meet

defendant's burden of production affirmative defense under section 1151). But see Cruz, 554 F.3d at
851 (noting that exercise of tribal jurisdiction was insufficient to satisfy government's burden under
section 1153 to prove Indian status beyond reasonable doubt).
227 Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 766 (finding it relevant that defendant indicated to Indian Health Service
clinic that he was Indian).
228 Id. (finding it relevant that defendant "lived and worked on the Rosebud reservation and
repeatedly held himself out as a non-member Indian to his Indian girlfriend and in socializing with
other Indians.").
229 Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225 (holding that tribal enrollment, and therefore a fortiori descendant
status is not dispositive of Indian status, and rejecting the argument that mere descendant status with
the concomitant eligibility to receive benefits is effectively sufficient to demonstrate tribal recognition).
230 Cruz, 554 F.3d at 848.
231See generally Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1982).
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Vialpando was described as a "man of the distinct facial and racial
characteristics of Indians and... fairly dark skinned., 232 He regularly
attended the yearly Shoshone Powwow and similar tribal events.233
Though Vialpando was one eighth Shoshone Indian, he was not an enrolled
member of the tribe. 4 He received certain benefits from the tribe
including living on Wind River Indian Reservation, being treated at the
BIA hospital for free, and provided hunting and fishing rights on the
reservation with a non-enrolled fishing permit. 23' Nevertheless, the
Wyoming court determined Vialpando's "life style is that of a non-Indian
except for recreation purposes and visitation." 236 In so deciding, the court
237
relied on a test promulgated by the Seventh Circuit in Ex parte Pero.
Under the Pero test, an "Indian" is defined as having a "[s]ubstantial
amount of Indian blood plus racial status in fact as an Indian., 238 Though
the Seventh Circuit held a woman of less than one-fourth Indian blood was
an Indian for "legal purposes" in a civil action, the court held Vialpando's
"one-eighth Indian Blood was not a 'substantial amount of blood"' for the
purposes of major crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1153.239
Perhaps more disturbing than court-crafted definitions arising from
statutory silence are instances when a statute provides a definition of
Indian but courts nevertheless impose further criteria than contemplated by
the statute. For instance, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applies to
"Indian children," which ICWA defines as tribal members or one eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child of a member of
an Indian tribe.240 Despite ICWA's clear dependence on tribal membership
as the defining criteria, some state courts have refused to recognize a child
as "Indian" where the court finds that the child is not part of an "existing
Indian family." Courts relying on the court-created "existing Indian family
exception" will only apply ICWA if it finds that the Indian child is part of
a recognizable Indian family or a family where the child has been exposed
to Indian culture.24 1 Still other states graft on a biological component,
232

Id. at 81.
id.
234 Id.
233

235Id.
236
237

Id. at 80.
Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 79 (Wyo. 1982) (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 29 (7th

Cir. 1938)).
238 Id. at
239

79-80 (quoting Pero, 99 F.2d at 29).
Id. at 80 (quoting State ex rel. Peterson v. Dist. Ct. of Ninth Jud. Dist., 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo.

1980)).
240

25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (2012).

241

In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); see also Angela Monguia, Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 14 CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 297, 302 (2004) (citing B.J. Jones,
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requiring that the child's parents must be of Indian heritage and have
significant ties to their tribe for IWCA to apply. 242 Thus, ICWA is
circumvented if a state court finds that the parents failed to measure up to
the court's expectations regarding their participation in tribal life or that
the parents lacked significant political, social, or cultural ties to the tribe.243
Sufficient ties may be found where the parents have
privately identified themselves as Indians and privately
observed tribal customs and, among other things, whether,
despite their distance from the reservation, they participated
in tribal community affairs, voted in tribal elections, or
otherwise took an interest in tribal politics, contributed to
tribal or Indian charities, subscribed to tribal newsletters or
other periodicals of special interest to Indians, participated in
Indian religious, social, cultural or political events which are
held in their own locality, or maintained social contacts with
other members of the Tribe. 2 4
Contrary to the statutory definition, state courts-rather than tribal
membership-determine whether a particular family is sufficiently Indian
for ICWA to apply. This is troubling for several reasons, aside from the
courts' willingness to ignore congressional intent and Supreme Court
precedent.245 First, the requirement that the parent or child adhere to a
state court's expectation of "Indian culture" creates a definition of "Indian"
that may bear little resemblance to tribal realities. Further, such a
definition cannot capture the diversity that exists among the more than
500-federally recognized tribes, resulting in a definition that can make
establishing "Indianness" difficult because the defining criteria are not
only defined by outsiders but are premised on an incorrect view of the
homogeneity of Indian cultures.246
Second, by defining their biological parents-and thus the child-as
outside Indian, these courts deny Indian children their legal status, as well
as their family lore and ethnographic identity. Denying ICWA application
most often paves the way for the child's adoption into non-Indian homes-the very thing ICWA was designed to protect against. 247 Congress enacted
ICWA to ensure the survival of Indian tribes by removing Indian family
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 15 (1995)).
242See Painter-Thome, supranote 40, at 371 & n.333.
243See In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175; In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 515-16.
244In

re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531.

245 Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).

246See

Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1373-74.

247See

generally Painter-Thome, supra note 40.
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issues from state control after concluding that abusive state practices had
created an "Indian child welfare crisis." The existing Indian family
exception directly subverts this goal by giving states, rather than tribes, the
power to determine who is an Indian child. Now, nearly all states,
including Kansas, recognize this problem with the existing Indian family
exception and view the exception as erroneous. Thankfully, most states
have rejected existing family exception doctrine, but a few states still retain
it. For Indian children in those states, state court decisions can rob them of
their ancestry before they even have an opportunity to know it.
IV.IDENTIFYING "INDIANS"

To varying degrees, both sides in the Warren controversy seemed to
accept "Indian" as a racial classification. That approach, however, ignores
the complexity of Indian identity in the United States.2 48 Just like other
groups, "Indian" encompasses what may be viewed as an ethnicity, a
culture, a political entity, and a "race." However, unlike other groups in
the United States, the complexity of Indian identity is often confused to
suggest that a claim of ancestry is an assertion of a legal right or
acceptance of a legal obligation. It would be incorrect to assume U.S. law
provides much clarity. Legally, while "Indian" might count as race for one
purpose, it might count as political status in another. But even in the law,
"Indian" is often treated as if there were a unified meaning. Of course,
Indians themselves have not settled on one definition that makes someone
"Indian. '249 "Indian identity,
in other words, continues to have an
250
meaning.
legal
ambiguous
As discussed above, whether a person is legally considered Indian
largely depends on the purpose for the claimed status. Consequently, an
248

Italso assumes that "race" is a fixed characteristic rather than a social construct. For instance,

in the United States, a racial distinction between Indians and African Americans was used to justify
slavery. See Gregory Ablavsky, Making Indians "White": The JudicialAbolition of Native Slavery in
Revolutionary Virginia and its RacialLegacy, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1457, 1473-76 (2011). Children of
Indian mothers were presumptively free, while the children of African American mothers were
presumptively enslaved. Thus, being "Indian" was quite literally the difference between being free and
being a slave-giving Indian status an elevated value. Id. at 1478.
249

Kevin Noble Maillard, Elizabeth Warren's Birther Moment, NY TIMES, (May 4, 2012),

http://perma.cc/RXW7-A7F4. Further complicating matters is the reality that there are more than five
hundred recognized Indian tribes, each with its own distinct cultural, social, and political practices.
Thus it is misleading to lump all Indian peoples into a single classification as does the Census. Prior to
colonization, Indian tribes did not consider themselves one homogenous group. Goldberg, supra note
62, at 1373-74. Rather, European colonists lumped all Indians into a single group while "the aboriginal
inhabitants of North America understood themselves solely in terms of their particular social, cultural,
and language groups, corresponding only very roughly to modem-day tribes." Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
250

Ablavsky, supra note 248, at 1480.
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individual could be considered Indian for one purpose, but not another.
For instance, a tribe's membership criteria might deem an individual
Indian-and thus eligible to participate in tribal governance and social
activities and to qualify for BIA or IHS services. Tribal membership,
however, might be insufficient to determine Indian status for purposes of
federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act or to ensure tribal
jurisdiction over an Indian child under the ICWA. As a consequence of an
unnecessarily complex diversity of definitions, individuals are deemed
Indian for some purposes, but not for others, resulting in a fractured
identity that depends on legal context more than citizenship, ethnology, or
ancestry.
With this in mind, the federal code could be viewed as an attempt to
codify all the nuances of identity into a system that seeks to ensure the
benefits and burdens of Indian identity are borne by those Congress and
individual tribes intended. Nonetheless, each definition has resulted in
over or under-inclusion. That is, each definition can result in some type of
identity "theft." Indian children adopted away from their tribe on the basis
of a state court's determination that their family is insufficiently Indian
may never know their heritage. Given the sovereign right of tribes to
define its citizens, tribes too are denied that right when courts impose the
existing Indian family exception, or when they find tribal membership
inadequate to classify a defendant as "Indian" in a criminal prosecution.
As Angelique EagleWoman commented on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Labuff:
I
find
it
entirely
inconsistent
that
tribal
sovereignty/enrollment is being overridden in federal
criminal prosecutions through the ability of non-Indian juries
to establish that a person is "Indian" under federal Indian law
for the purpose of prosecution but not eligible for educational
benefits as an "Indian" by failing to meet the requirements of
tribal enrollment or the 1/4th blood quantum standard under
federal regulations. Apparently, criminalizing a person as
"Indian" is easier than supporting
a person's ability to attain
251
an education as an "Indian.,
As EagleWoman's comment suggests, the lack of definitional
consistency creates unnecessary confusion and threatens to undermine
confidence in legal decision-making. Nevertheless, to prevent such a rigid
line that a person's individual pride of heritage is silenced or dismissed as
illegitimate requires some flexibility. Assuming there could be one unified
25' Angelique EagleWoman, Comment to Ninth CircuitDecides Indian Status Case Under Major
Crimes Act, TURTLE TALK (Oct. 11,2011, 12:13 PM), http://perma.cc/34T7-G5AU.
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definition of Indian under federal law, the question would remain whether
any definition would provide clarity without excluding legitimate claims to
Indian identity. What is needed is a clear line between claims of ethnicity
and claims of legal right or obligation-that is, a demarcation between
ethnicity and citizenship. The most obvious answer-and the one
supported by principles of sovereignty-is that individual tribes should
decide based on tribal citizenship. That is, to actually have tribal
membership be treated as citizenship, and embrace the spirit and letter of
Mancari by basing Indian status entirely on political membership in a tribe.
Such an approach would reflect the government-to-government
relationship cited by Mancari as the basis for the myriad laws that directly
affect Indian people.
Equating legal Indian status with tribal citizenship would have several
repercussions. Depending on the tribe's citizenship criteria, citizenshipand thus tribal and federal benefits and obligations-could extend to those
who were not ethnographically Indian. For instance, citizenship based on
residency could apply to anyone residing on reservation lands, which, for
most reservations includes a high percentage of residents with no Indian
ancestry. However, a tribe that extended citizenship to nonresidents,
would then ensure that those Indian persons residing outside Indian
Country would be eligible for tribal and federal benefits. On the other
hand, it would also mean that nontribal citizens who are ethnographically
Indian would lose any benefits that are currently not tied to tribal
membership.
Furthermore, the historical hesitancy to completely rely on tribal
membership may reflect a reluctance to allow tribal membership criteria to
determine who is governed by various federal laws. There is some reason
for concern. Under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, tribes can exclude
individuals from citizenship using discriminatory criteria. 252 Moreover, a
tribe that relied on some level of participation in tribal life or where
political decisions have led to the ouster of individual members, linking
citizenship to federal benefits could have a chilling effect on dissenting
voices in the tribe if individuals fear a loss of citizenship could also mean
the loss of those benefits. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court explained in
Martinez, "[a] tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal
purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an
independent political community., 253 To the extent we believe that the
government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal
252 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (finding that tribal rule that

granted membership to children of male members who married outside tribe but denied membership to
children of female members who married outside tribe was not subject to federal review).
253

Id.
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government is the basis for tribal benefits, then it is well past time to
incorporate Mancari'sreasoning into federal law defining Indian status.
Finally, relying on a legal definition based on citizenship might also
influence the way Indian ancestry is perceived by creating a clearer
distinction between legal Indian status and ancestry or family history. That
is, in much the same way that millions of Americans claim ancestry in
other nations without implicating any legal obligation or incurring any
benefit, those persons of Indian descent could be recognized as having
ancestry without citizenship. That would allow those individuals claiming
Indian identity for the intangible benefits-for the sense of belonging,
ancestral history-to do so without implicating any tangible benefits that
would be conferred through tribal citizenship.
V. CONCLUSION

Unlike other cultural groups, whether one is an "Indian" has not been
treated as a simple matter of genealogy, but as a matter of law that carries
implications beyond personal identity.254 Although most people asserting a
particular identity-even a lawyer like Warren-are not necessarily
making a legal claim to any tangible benefits, critics of Warren conflated
her self-stated genealogical identity with a legal status that may confer
legal benefits. Legal status or legal definitions are unlikely to satisfy those
who base their identity on family history. Like Elizabeth Warren, these
individuals know who they are, they know their own heritage. Requiring
that such claims meet a legal definition subjects the claimants to
requirements not found in claims to other ethnic identities and seems
patently unfair. Nonetheless, when benefits and obligations as tribal
citizens attach to that identity, there must be something more than a naked
claim of kinship. While allowing tribal law to determine citizenship based
on individual tribal criteria might seem to create more confusion, the
solution necessarily calls out for just that type of flexibility, due to the
diversity of tribes and the diversity of legal implications.

254See

Ray, supra note 54, at 399.

